Legal Developments
A Jury Just Ordered a Defendant to Pay $450,000 for Harassing His Male Staffers.
In July 2026, a Leon County, Florida jury took about two hours to find sitting state Representative Fabián Basabe liable for sexual harassment, battery, and defamation, and ordered him to pay $450,000 to two former staffers.
The plaintiffs were two young men — a legislative aide and an unpaid intern. The lawsuit had been filed in 2023 and took nearly three years to reach a verdict. Basabe represented himself, called no witnesses, and has maintained there was no evidence supporting the claims. He has not been criminally charged, and two internal House investigations had previously found insufficient evidence of wrongdoing.
A jury disagreed with those investigations.
Here are four lessons that translate directly to any employees in Tennessee experiencing sexual harassment or battery.
Lesson 1: Men Get Sexually Harassed at Work, and the Law Protects Them
Both plaintiffs here were young men. Reporting describes them as straight men harassed by a man.
This is not an exotic legal theory. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously in 1998 that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. It does not matter whether the harasser and the target are the same sex. It does not matter whether either of them is gay. What matters is whether the conduct was because of sex and was severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions.
The EEOC receives thousands of sexual harassment charges from men every year, and they are a meaningful share of the total. And yet male employees consistently do not call lawyers, for reasons that are not legal at all.
Unwanted touching is unwanted touching. A supervisor who slaps a subordinate, gropes him, propositions him, or makes him the target of relentless sexual commentary has the same legal exposure regardless of anyone's gender.
Lesson 2: Interns and Non-Employees Have Options Too
One of the plaintiffs was a legislative intern. That matters legally, and it's a trap a lot of people fall into.
Title VII protects "employees." Unpaid interns frequently do not qualify, because courts generally require some form of significant remuneration for an employment relationship to exist. The same problem can affect volunteers, independent contractors, and students in placements. Tennessee has no statute specifically extending harassment protections to unpaid interns.
So does an intern who gets groped just have no recourse?
No — and this case shows exactly why. The jury found battery, a common-law tort that has nothing to do with employment status. Anyone can sue anyone for battery. The same is true of assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy.
This is one of the most underused tools in employment law. If you are an intern, a contractor, a volunteer, a gig worker, or a staffing-agency placement, the statutory route may be closed to you while the tort route is wide open.
Lesson 3: An Internal Investigation That Clears the Harasser
Two separate internal investigations conducted for the Florida House found insufficient evidence, and an external ethics review came back inconclusive.
The jury needed two hours.
This is the single most demoralizing moment in most harassment cases: HR concludes its investigation, sends a carefully worded email saying the allegations "could not be substantiated," and the employee assumes that's the end of the road. It is not, for reasons worth understanding:
The investigator works for the employer. Even a scrupulous HR investigator is operating inside an institution with an interest in the outcome, and outside counsel retained by the company is not neutral either.
The standard is different. Internal investigations apply whatever standard the company chooses. A civil jury applies preponderance of the evidence — more likely than not. That is a low bar, and much lower than "we couldn't substantiate it."
The evidence is different. Investigators don't have subpoena power. Your lawyer does. Text messages, prior complaints by other employees, deleted Slack messages, personnel files of the harasser, and testimony compelled under oath frequently do not surface until litigation.
The scope is different. Investigations are often deliberately narrow, examining a single incident rather than a pattern.
A finding of "inconclusive" is not a verdict. It is one interested party's opinion, produced without the tools that actually establish facts.
Lesson 4: When They Smear You for Complaining, That's a Separate Claim
The jury also found Basabe liable for defamation — of the former aide and of the aide's mother, over social media posts.
We often see employers who claim employees were terminated for performance, even if it was really retaliation. If the employer chooses to make social media posts about the termination--an extreme case no doubt--you may also be entitled to additional compensation.
Social media posts with false information can be defamation, and it is a claim entirely separate from your harassment claim — with its own damages, not subject to Title VII or THRA caps.
Tennessee's deadlines here are unforgiving, and short:
Slander — spoken defamation: six months (Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-103)
Libel — written or published defamation: one year (Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104)
Six months. That is very likely the shortest limitations period you will encounter in this area of law, and it can expire while your EEOC charge is still sitting in the queue. If someone has said something false and damaging about you in the wake of a complaint, that specific claim needs attention now, not after the discrimination case resolves.
Note also that the plaintiff set here included a family member. A defamation claim belongs to whoever was defamed, not only to the employee.
One Harassment Claim, One Courthouse: The Sixth Circuit Says the EFAA Keeps Your Whole Case Out of Arbitration
Finally, some relief for workers who have been sexually harassed or assaulted at work.
A new decision from the Sixth Circuit just made it significantly harder for employers to force workers into private arbitration—and it started right here in Nashville.
On February 25, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, No. 25-5210, affirming an order from Judge Aleta Trauger of the Middle District of Tennessee. The opinion is clear: it holds that when a lawsuit includes a viable sexual-harassment claim, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to the entire case—not just the harassment claim itself. For employees, the EFFA is a powerful tool to ensure you won’t be silenced and you can have your day in court.
The background: a statute built to end forced silence
To understand Bruce, you have to start with the law it interprets. In the wake of the #MeToo movement, Congress passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021—the EFAA. The statute amended the Federal Arbitration Act, which for nearly a century had let employers funnel almost any workplace dispute into binding, confidential arbitration.
Arbitration tends to favor employers. The proceedings are private, the outcomes are rarely public, and the decision-maker is often paid by the company. The EFAA carved out an exception: at the employee's election, a "predispute arbitration agreement" is no longer "valid or enforceable with respect to a case" that relates to a sexual-assault or sexual-harassment dispute. In plain terms, an employee with a harassment claim can choose to go to open court rather than be forced into arbitration.
What the statute did not spell out is what happens when a single lawsuit mixes a harassment claim with other, unrelated claims. Can an employer peel off the non-harassment claims and send those to arbitration? That is the question Bruce answered.
What happened in Bruce v. Adams & Reese
Randi Bruce worked as a paralegal in a law firm's "Liquor Group." When that group moved from one firm to Adams & Reese, she moved with it—and so did a supervising attorney whose conduct became the basis of her claims. According to her complaint, the supervisor repeatedly directed sexualized comments and jokes at her during work conversations and team meetings: telling colleagues to send her to clients "in a short skirt," substituting a slur for ordinary phrases, and making graphic remarks about her in front of others. She alleged the conduct was persistent and continued until the day she was fired.
Bruce sued, bringing a Title VII sexual-harassment claim alongside two claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act tied to her termination. Adams & Reese had a broad arbitration agreement covering essentially all employment disputes. The firm conceded that the EFAA kept the harassment claim in court—but moved to dismiss that claim and to compel arbitration of the ADA claims, arguing those were separate and arbitrable.
Judge Trauger denied both motions. She held that Bruce had adequately pleaded sexual harassment and that, because the case related to a sexual-harassment dispute, the EFAA blocked arbitration of the whole case, ADA claims included. The firm appealed.
What the Sixth Circuit decided
The panel split 2-1, with Judge Karen Nelson Moore writing for the majority and Judge John Ritz concurring. The court answered two questions.
First, the pleading question. A&R argued Bruce's complaint described only a couple of isolated, one-off comments—not enough to clear Title VII's demanding "severe or pervasive" standard. The majority disagreed. Reading the complaint in Bruce's favor, the court emphasized her allegations that the supervisor "would" make certain comments—language signaling habitual, repeated conduct—and that the harassment was "persistent" and "ongoing." That was enough to plausibly allege a hostile work environment and survive a motion to dismiss. Notably, the court refused to require a plaintiff to catalog every single offensive remark; demanding that level of detail, it explained, would impose a heightened pleading burden Congress never wrote into the rules. (The court did decline to consider the supervisor's earlier conduct at the prior firm, because Adams & Reese could not be held vicariously liable for harassment that predated the employment relationship.)
Second, the arbitration question. This was an issue of first impression in the Sixth Circuit. The court grounded its answer in a single word. The EFAA bars arbitration "with respect to a case." Congress could have written "claim." It chose "case." Reading the statute's ordinary meaning, the court held that "case" refers to the entire civil proceeding, not an individual cause of action. So once a lawsuit contains a viable sexual-harassment claim, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to the whole lawsuit—including claims, like Bruce's ADA counts, that have nothing to do with the harassment. The court noted this reading matches the prevailing view among the federal district courts that have grappled with the question.
The practical upshot: employers cannot "split" a case to drag the unrelated pieces into private arbitration. If one qualifying harassment claim is plausibly pleaded, it unlocks the courthouse doors for everything.
Why this matters
For employees: A plausibly pleaded sexual-harassment claim keeps you in court if you choose. If you have a claim, you may be able to litigate your entire lawsuit in open court—including discrimination, retaliation, or other claims that an arbitration agreement would otherwise capture. The leverage and transparency that come with public litigation can change the entire trajectory of a case.
For employers: Mandatory arbitration programs no longer offer the protection they once did. A single viable harassment allegation can pull an entire multi-claim lawsuit out of arbitration and into federal court. That raises the stakes of harassment complaints dramatically—and makes prevention, training, and prompt internal response more important than ever.
Because the pleading question turned on how the complaint was drafted, Bruce is also a reminder that how a harassment claim is alleged can determine whether the whole case stays in court. The wording matters.
EmployLegal represents employees in workplace disputes in Nashville, Tennessee. If you have questions about how the EFAA or this decision affects your situation, contact us.
This article is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every situation is fact-specific; consult a licensed attorney about your particular circumstances.
Sixth Circuit Issues Major Win for Older Workers in Kean v. Brinker
Even seemingly innocent statements about age can indicate bias. In Kean v. Brinker International, Inc., the federal appeals court reversed summary judgment for the employer in a case that echoes what so many of our clients at EmployLegal already know: age discrimination is real, and often hidden behind vague buzzwords like "culture" or "fit."
What happened?
Jeff Kean, a 59-year-old general manager of a top-performing Chili’s restaurant in Tennessee, was fired and replaced by someone 26 years younger with no managerial experience. Despite his outstanding performance metrics and glowing reviews from employees, the company claimed it let him go because he wasn’t “living the Chili’s way”—a vague reference to workplace “culture.”
What did they say?
The Sixth Circuit saw through the defense. The court noted several critical facts:
Kean’s performance was objectively excellent;
There was no documentation supporting complaints about him;
Comments about his age—such as calling him “Grandpa” and “Old Man”—reflected a broader culture of age bias;
And the employer’s justification unraveled under scrutiny, especially because the restaurant was thriving.
The court emphasized that even non-derogatory comments about age can be relevant evidence of discrimination—particularly when they coincide with sudden terminations or pretextual justifications.
Why this case matters.
Too often, older employees are told they were let go due to “restructuring,” “changing culture,” or “lack of work.” Yet behind those vague explanations may be a very different reality: the employer wants someone younger, cheaper, or who simply “looks” more like their desired brand.
In the Kean decision, the Sixth Circuit reminded employers that those explanations don’t hold up when the facts—and the law—point elsewhere.
What Should You Do If This Sounds Familiar?
If you’ve been:
Let go after age-related comments,
Replaced by a much younger employee,
Given unclear or contradictory reasons for termination, or
Pushed out despite strong performance,
You may have a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or similar state laws.
At EmployLegal, we specialize in fighting for fairness in the workplace. We represent employees—only employees—and we understand how subtle, coded, and isolating age discrimination can be.
Title VII Protects Everyone. Period.
The Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion overturning the 6th Circuit precedent that required extra steps needed for "reverse discrimination" claims.
On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court quietly but decisively swept away a legal barrier that for decades had made “reverse-discrimination” suits harder to pursue in much of the country. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson held that Title VII gives every worker—whether a member of a historically marginalized group or the majority—the same path to prove discrimination, and that lower courts may not graft extra pleading requirements onto claims brought by white, male, heterosexual, or otherwise majority-group plaintiffs.
The ruling came in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services. Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman with two decades at the state’s juvenile-justice agency, alleged she was twice passed over for promotion—and later demoted—for the benefit of LGBTQ colleagues. Both the trial court and the Sixth Circuit threw out her case, relying on a doctrine that required “background circumstances” showing the employer was the rare one that discriminates against majorities before a lawsuit could even move forward. Five circuits, including the Sixth, had adhered to that rule; seven did not, and two had rejected it outright—producing the sort of split the Supreme Court is fond of resolving.
Justice Jackson’s opinion traced the problem to a 1976 D.C. Circuit decision that, she said, “misread” the text of Title VII. That statute bars discrimination “because of” race, sex, or other protected traits, without regard to which group turns out to be victim or beneficiary. By demanding extra “background circumstances” evidence from majority-group plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit had given them a steeper climb than any other claimant—something, the Court said, the statute never contemplated. In plain terms, the justices concluded, courts cannot decide that some plaintiffs must do more simply because of who they are.
The decision carries immediate consequences in twenty states and the District of Columbia, where the discarded test had still been in force. Plaintiffs in those jurisdictions now advance under the familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas framework: they make a prima-facie showing; the employer articulates a legitimate reason; the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove pretext. No fourth-step “background circumstances” filter survives. Employment lawyers expect a noticeable uptick in majority-group discrimination filings, particularly challenges to corporate diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives that can be framed as disadvantaging members of traditional majorities.
Any policy that confers a tangible benefit—or imposes a career hurdle—on the basis of a protected trait now invites closer scrutiny. Promotion files, bonus rationales, and reduction-in-force matrices will need meticulous documentation that decisions were driven by legitimate business criteria, not demographic targets. Meanwhile, litigators defending earlier cases premised on the Sixth Circuit test will have to withdraw or revise motions that leaned on the now-defunct standard.
The Court remanded Ames’s case for further proceedings; whether she ultimately wins will turn on more traditional questions of motive and proof. But the broader takeaway is clear: under Title VII, the doors to the courthouse must be the same width for everyone. By closing a doctrinal detour that made them narrower for some, the Supreme Court has shifted the terrain of workplace-bias litigation—and, in the process, reminded lower courts that statutory text, not judicial intuition about which groups most often suffer discrimination, sets the rules of engagement.
Commute-related ADA accommodations
Commute-related ADA accommodations will be considered on a case-by-case basis as the law intended.
Seventh Circuit Clarifies ADA Accommodations for Commute-Related Challenges
In a pivotal decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the extent to which the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to accommodate employees' commute-related challenges. The case, EEOC v. Charter Communications, LLC, involved an employee with cataracts who requested a modified work schedule to avoid nighttime driving, which was denied by the employer after an initial temporary accommodation.
Background of the Case
James Kimmons, employed at Charter Communications' call center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, suffered from cataracts that impaired his night vision, making his evening commute hazardous. He requested to start and end his shifts earlier to avoid driving in the dark. Charter granted this request for 30 days but declined to extend it, citing that commuting falls outside the scope of workplace accommodations under the ADA. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit on Kimmons' behalf, alleging failure to accommodate his disability.
Seventh Circuit's Ruling
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Charter Communications. The appellate court held that while employers are generally not obligated to accommodate commuting difficulties, exceptions exist when:
The employee's disability substantially interferes with the ability to commute.
Physical attendance at the workplace is an essential job function.
The requested accommodation, such as a schedule adjustment, is reasonable and does not impose undue hardship on the employer.(eeoc.gov)
The court emphasized that determining the reasonableness of such accommodations requires a fact-specific inquiry, considering factors like the nature of the job, the employee's disability, and the potential impact on business operations.(eeoc.gov)
Implications for Employers and Employees
This decision underscores the importance of the interactive process between employers and employees when addressing accommodation requests. Employers should not dismiss requests related to commuting challenges without a thorough analysis of the specific circumstances. Similarly, employees should be aware that while the ADA does not automatically require accommodations for commuting difficulties, there are situations where such accommodations may be warranted.
A Warning to Employers using Outdated Sixth Circuit Precedent
The Seventh Circuit expressly noted that decisions that treat commute-related accommodations as categorically outside the ADA’s scope—including a notable Sixth Circuit decision that took that view. Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit--previously believed to be a part of a circuit split in agreement with the Sixth--now leaves little doubt that the standard is still a reasonable test for every ADA accommodation request and nothing is wholesale excepted. There is no wholesale exception for commute-related limitations, and any such broad carveout is inconsistent with the ADA’s text and purpose.
Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in EEOC v. Charter Communications clarifies that while employers are not universally required to accommodate commute-related issues, there are scenarios where the ADA may necessitate such accommodations. Both employers and employees should engage in open dialogue and consider all relevant factors to determine appropriate accommodations that enable individuals with disabilities to perform their essential job functions effectively.
What is a Title VII Claim?
Title VII claims are often at the heart of employment cases.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one of the most important federal laws protecting employees from unfair treatment in the workplace. It prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of:
Race
Color
National Origin
Sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity)
Religion
Title VII applies to private employers with 15 or more employees, as well as state and local governments, employment agencies, and labor organizations.
At EmployLegal, we help employees across Tennessee enforce their rights under Title VII—whether they’ve been wrongfully terminated, retaliated against, or subjected to harassment. Below, we break down what Title VII covers and what it takes to prove a claim.
1. Discrimination Under Title VII
Discrimination occurs when an employer takes a negative action against you (such as firing, demoting, or refusing to hire) because of your race, sex, religion, or another protected characteristic.
📌 Elements of a Title VII Discrimination Claim:
To prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination, you generally must show:
You are a member of a protected class
You were qualified for your position
You suffered an adverse employment action (e.g., termination, demotion, denial of promotion)
Someone outside your protected class was treated more favorably, or your employer replaced you with someone outside your class
Once you establish these elements (a "prima facie" case), the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate reason for its action. If they do, you must show that reason is a pretext for discrimination.
2. Retaliation Under Title VII
Retaliation happens when an employer punishes you for engaging in a protected activity—like reporting discrimination, filing an EEOC charge, or participating in a coworker’s case.
📌 Elements of a Retaliation Claim:
You engaged in protected activity (such as complaining about discrimination)
You suffered a materially adverse action (not just termination—even warnings, reassignments, or schedule cuts may count)
There’s a causal connection between your protected activity and the adverse action
Timing is often key. The closer the retaliation follows your complaint, the stronger your case.
3. Hostile Work Environment (Harassment)
Title VII also protects you from harassment that is so severe or pervasive that it creates a hostile or abusive work environment based on your protected status.
📌 Elements of a Hostile Work Environment Claim:
You are a member of a protected class
You were subjected to unwelcome conduct (e.g., slurs, jokes, touching, exclusion)
The conduct was based on your protected class
The conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter your work environment
The employer knew or should have known and failed to take corrective action
Harassment can come from supervisors, coworkers, or even third parties like customers.
Final Takeaway
Title VII offers broad protections—but proving a claim takes strategy, evidence, and a clear understanding of the law. If you believe your rights have been violated, don’t wait. At EmployLegal, we help workers take action and reclaim their power.
Need help now? Contact us for a consultation. We’ll help you understand your options and fight back.
Stay Informed on the Latest in the Middle District of Tennessee and the Sixth Circuit
At EmployLegal, we keep you up to date on the most important employment law decisions coming out of the Middle District of Tennessee and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. From wrongful termination rulings to FMLA and Title VII updates, we break down how evolving case law affects your workplace rights.